How Democracies Die - Levitsky & Ziblatt

How democracies die - Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt

How do democracies die?

Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt trace the historical patterns of subversion and collapse in How Democracies Die. The authors contend that mutual tolerance, forbearance, and reciprocity are central to democratic order. As democracy is inherently fragile, growing polarisation and cumbersome institutions should give pause for worry.

The face of collapse

Military coup is the stereotypical picture of democratic collapse. Indeed, since the Cold War, coups d’état accounted for nearly three quarters of democratic failures. In most cases, military coercion and force play a dangerous role. But democracies, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, can degenerate in more inconspicuous ways — through elected leaders “who subvert the very process that brought them into power”. The authors point, for example, to Hugo Chavez, who promised Venezuela a more “authentic” democracy, but whose government descended ultimately into authoritarianism. Given enough time, extreme demagogues can and do appear. The United States too is replete with examples, like Huey Long and Joseph McCarthy.

Warning signs

To keep demagogues away, we must first identify them. Building on Juan Linz’s The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Levitsky and Ziblatt observe common red flags among potential autocrats. They tend to: (1) reject democratic rules and norms, whether in words or action; (2) deny the legitimacy of their opponents; (3) tolerate or encourage violence; and (4) exhibit a willingness to diminish the civil liberties of their opponents and institutions.

“Democracies require negotiation, compromise and concessions. Setbacks are inevitable, victories always partial… All politicians are frustrated by these constraints, but democratic ones know they must accept them… But for outsiders, particularly those of a demagogic bent, …, checks and balances feel like a straitjacket”.
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die.

Gatekeepers

Political parties should treat each other as legitimate rivals to preserve the political process. But it also seems necessary to restrain the legitimacy of ideologues that subvert democracy. But who’s to say who knows best about such matters? Democracies cannot prohibit candidates from seeking election. That in of itself is undemocratic.

Gatekeeping, in this sense, rests with voters and political parties (as imperfect a process as it may be). Political parties, the authors say, must distance themselves from dangerous ideologues. As the first line of defence, they must choose candidates that represent the values of their voters and filter out candidates that “pose a threat to democracy” itself.

“Institutions alone are not enough to rein in elected autocrats. Constitutions must be defended — by political parties and organised citizens, but also by democratic norms… The tragic paradox of the electoral route to authoritarianism is that democracy’s assassins use the very institutions of democracy — gradually, subtly, and even legally — to kill it.”
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die.

The Devil’s Bargain

Unfortunately, political incumbents often succumb to the “devil’s bargain”. With a “mix of ambition, fear and miscalculation”, they invite the charismatic newcomer into politics in hopes of harnessing their appeal. Much like the Horse, the Stag, and the Hunter of Aesop’s Fables, this often transfers “the keys of power” to the eventual autocrat. The authors point to Benito Mussolini‘s rise and fall as an example of this.

A demagogue’s blueprint

Democratic collapse doesn’t need a master plan. A “demagogic, norm-breaking leader”, “a threatened political establishment” and a “climate of panic, hostility, and mutual distrust” can provide fertile grounds for collapse. One tactic is to introduce sweeping constitutional reforms during times of crises. Autocrats in-waiting may use “economic crises, natural disasters, and especially security threats … to justify antidemocratic measures” for the public good.

“Elected autocrats [may] maintain a veneer of democracy while eviscerating its substance”.
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die.

After all, it’s easier for demagogues to rationalise authoritarian measures in the public’s mind when fear is high. Fujimori’s presidential coup in Peru, for example, followed waves of extended hyperinflation and guerilla insurgencies. And in the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in response to the Manila bombings (which his military manufactured).

Borrowing from Richard Hofstadter in The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Levitsky and Ziblatt describe how demagogues might capitalise on “status anxiety” to generate fervent support. This is especially so when people believe that their “social status, identity, and sense of belonging … [is] under existential threat”.

“Citizens become more likely to tolerate, and even endorse, authoritarian measures when they fear for their security. … Security crises are, therefore, moments of danger for democracy”.
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die.

Captured referees

Once in power, authoritarian rule depends on the extent to which they control “the referees”. They will seek to replace critical positions in major institutions, from the justice system to the free press, with loyalists. Tactics range from defamation suits, buyouts, jail time and exiles, to outright assassination. And with the referees captured, institutions will struggle to check and balance unrestrained power. This, in turn, may produce a feedback loop, where heightened fear of government generates even greater self-censorship and acquiescence.

Tolerance and forbearance

Constitutions, by their lonesome, cannot guarantee democracy. It cannot resolve every contingency, ambiguity, or interpretation. This is true, no matter how well our founders wrote them. The guardrails of democracy depend mightily on the strength and quality of its norms and informal rules that exist outside the constitution and legislation.

Mutual tolerance

Levitsky and Ziblatt observe two norms in the Madisonian system that help to preserve American democracy: mutual tolerance and forbearance. We have mutual tolerance when political parties and politicians recognise and “accept one another as legitimate rivals”. They treat each other not as heretical or treasonous enemies, but as legitimate opponents with “equal right to exist, compete for power, and govern” (assuming they abide by the rules and ideals of the constitution).

Forbearance

Forbearance is the exercise of “self-control” and “restraint”, as to avoid actions that violate the “spirit” of democracy, even when it’s legal. A good example of this is the two-term limit for U.S. presidents. Prior to the 1951 amendment, the two-term limit wasn’t part of American law. But “George Washington’s retirement after two terms in 1797”, the authors say, “[had] set a powerful precedent.” Even in 1892, “the Democratic Party refused to nominate Grover Cleveland for a non-consecutive third term” as to not “violate an unwritten law”. Forbearance, in this way, cultivated an orderly succession of power.

Courtesy and reciprocity

Levitsky and Ziblatt highlight two more “folkways” that underpin forbearance: courtesy and reciprocity. Courtesy in politics involves “avoiding personal and embarrassing attacks”. Reciprocating courtesies can help politicians to sustain forbearance.

Streetball as a microcosm

The authors liken democratic norms to the informal rules of street basketball. Those of you who have played pick-up basketball know that there are no referees. Yet, players abide by informal rules to preserve the flow and fairness of the game. In street basketball, “shared codes of conduct” like calling your own fouls, becomes common knowledge that all players accept and respect. Trash talking aside, there’s a great deal of tolerance, forbearance, reciprocity, and courtesy in street basketball. Without informal rules, the game degenerates into conflict and disagreement. (Of course, such games are easier to organise and enforce when there’s only four to ten players involved.)

Saving democracy

To uphold the system, “public officials [have to] use their institutional prerogatives judiciously”. Executive orders, court packing, and presidential pardons are susceptible to misuse. Similar temptations exist in Congress with the filibuster, impeachments and related mechanisms. Without restraint, democratic dysfunction, gridlock, and breakdowns become more likely. Politicians have to find a way out of their Prisoner’s Dilemma and short-term political manoeuvring.

“For many Americans, the economic changes of the last few decades have brought decreased job security, longer working hours, fewer prospects for upward mobility, and, consequently, a growth in social resentment. Resentment fuels polarization.”
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die.

The fall of Rome?

While it’s easy to paint a picture of impending doom, most democracies around the world “remain [relatively] intact”. From McCarthyism to Watergate, American politics too has survived many tests. But we also know that polarisation and intolerance is on the rise. The U.S. Capitol attack in early 2021 is probably the most recent and visceral reminder of this.

The question is whether a nation can repair itself once cracks in its democratic foundations surface. Should we expect healing and restoration, or greater fragility and degeneration? Is the United States, for example, destined to a fate not unlike the Roman Empire? (For more on American-Roman parallels, I recommend Vaclav Smil’s Why America is Not a New Rome.)

Unsurprisingly, Levitsky and Ziblatt believe that the future rests on our ability to restore tolerance, and forbearance; and to strike at the roots of deep-seated polarity that divide us today. Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson make a similar argument in Why Nations Fail, highlighting the importance of inclusive political and economic institutions. The direction we need to take is obvious. The course of action, and its execution, on the other hand, is not straight forward at all.

“We think it would be more valuable to focus on two underlying forces driving American polarization: racial and religious realignment and growing economic inequality. Addressing these social foundations, we believe, requires a reshuffling of what America’s political parties stand for.”
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt. (2018). How Democracies Die.

Learning from children

To end, I’m always amazed with the games and rules that children formulate for themselves. Isn’t it wonderful to see them organise into so many imaginative, adventurous and delightful activities? Yes, kids fight from time to time. But children in their good nature can put grudges aside and return to play right away. Many, perhaps in their naivety, believe in a simple yet warming sense of fairness and ideals. At what point do we transition from these curious sponges to factional rocks? Could we learn a thing or two from them?